It is common for an intellectual property owner to hold several patents covering technologies that are valuable only if used together. We compare the welfare properties of package licenses, under which a licensee pays the same fee regardless of the number of technologies licensed, with component licenses, under which each technology is licensed separately and there is no quantity discount. A central finding is that, in many settings, a long-term package license creates incentives for licensees to invent around patents and to invest in complementary assets that are closer to their socially optimal levels than does a long-term component license. We also identify settings in which a short-term license is a partial substitute for a package license and a prohibition on package licensing induces parties to adopt contracts that result in less efficient complementary investment because of hold-up problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is common for an intellectual property owner to hold several patents covering technologies that are valuable only if used together. While it would seem natural to offer the rights to use these patents under a single license, such "package licensing" has long been greeted with skepticism under antitrust policy. 1 Two common objections to package licensing are claims that the practice: (a) forces licensees to purchase intellectual property rights that they do not want or need, and (b) discourages attempts to innovate around specific patents or have specific patents declared invalid, uninfringed, or unenforceable.
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The proffered logic behind this second claim is that getting out from under the need to license a single patent would yield no economic return to the licensee because he or she would face the same package price for the remaining patents in the bundle. 3 The first argument against package licensing is readily dismissed given that the overall exchange between the licensor and licensee is voluntary and the marginal costs of including 1 See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Intellectual Property Guidelines, April 6, 1995 . Some courts have found package licensing unlawful where the licensor refused to license separate patents. See, e.g., Hazeltine Research v. Zenith Radio, 388 F.2d 25, 33-35 (7 th Cir. 1967) , 395 U.S. 100 (1969) . 2 A similar theory was proposed in at least one private case, Discovision Associates v. Disc Manufacturing, Inc., 1997 WL 309499 (D.Del.) . One of the authors was expert witness for the potential licensor in that matter. The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice issued several business review letters regarding patent pools that embodied the view that component licensing is beneficial, in part, because it facilitates inventing around proper subsets of the patents in a pool. See letters from Joel I. Klein to Garrad R. Beeney, June 26, 1997 and December 16, 1998 , and letter from Joel I. Klein to Carey R. Ramos, June 10, 1999. The Federal Trade Commission objected to the merger of Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz in part because the combined company would control a portfolio of patents that would deter competitors. See Tom and Newberg (1997) . The Federal Trade Commission's case against Intel alleged a refusal to provide potential competitors with technical information about Intel's patents. The alleged conduct is similar in some respects to a refusal to license individual patents. See U. S. Federal Trade Commission (1998) . 3 Critics of package licensing sometimes assert that a package license containing a large number of patents overwhelms the ability of potential licensees to evaluate whether they would infringe most or all of the component patents. This is not a bundling issue, however. The same problem would arise under sequential licensing of the patent portfolio. additional patents in a license are zero or nearly so. The flaws in the second argument are more subtle and are the subject of the formal analysis below.
Antitrust concern with the packaging of two or more distinct products comes up in many other settings, under names such as bundling, tying, and block booking. There is an extensive economics literature examining these practices, and it is helpful at the outset to identify what distinguishes package licensing in our model from these other practices. Package licensing is of particular interest for a number of reasons:
• Package licenses often contain patents that are strongly complementary in the sense that the underlying intellectual property covered by each patent can be put into application only if one also makes use of the intellectual property covered by the other patents. In these instances, there is no sense in which users have separate valuations of the different patents. Thus, the motive to use bundling or block booking to "average out" valuations across different units does not arise.
4
• The patents in a package often are used in fixed proportions. Consequently, packaging complementary patents is not motivated by metering or Ramsey taxation considerations that may arise with other goods.
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• The inclusion of additional patents in a package license typically has near-zero incremental cost. From a purely static perspective, even small transaction costs associated with licensing individual patents can make combining patents in a package both socially and privately desirable. 4 See, e.g., Adams and Yellen (1976) , McAfee et al (1989) , and Stigler (1963) .
• A licensee may desire an inclusive license to reduce the potential for hold-up. Separate licensing on a patent-by-patent basis exposes a licensee to high royalties for any additional patents that are necessary to produce a commercial product after the licensee has agreed to pay fees for the rights to an initial subset of the necessary patents. A package license that covers all present and future patents owned by a given licensor can reduce this hold-up risk.
Several papers, including Whinston (1990) , Choi and Stefanadis (2001) , and Carlton and Waldman (2002) , have explored how tying can serve as a form of entry deterrence. On the surface, these models identify forces similar to those underlying the argument that package licensing discourages entry (here, innovation) incentives. At a deeper level, however, the forces at work are very different. For example, in Whinston's model, technological tying is a means of committing to a low price in response to entry. In contrast, in our model package licensing serves a function equivalent to raising some post-entry licensee fees. Furthermore, the earlier models require a commitment to bundled pricing. Package licensing of complementary patents is a contractual, not technological tie, and renegotiation is feasible. A related difference between our model and the entry-deterrence literature is that the buyer in our model enters the input market itself, so that it internalizes the gains in consumer surplus due to competition. Other models assume that the innovator is motivated solely by its profits from the innovation, and thus a reduction in the prices charged by the incumbent can deter entry. Implicitly these models 5 For an early discussion of using tying to facilitate metering-based price discriminating, see Bowman (1957) . For an early (and under-appreciated) discussion of tying to facilitate Ramsey taxation, including the tying of unrelated goods, see Burstein (1960). assume that buyers are small and uncoordinated, and thus unwilling to provide ex ante support for entry.
Below, we examine the welfare properties of equilibrium licensing contracts and how these contracts are affected by the antitrust treatment of package licensing undertaken by a single intellectual property owner.
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In our model, a tie in the form of a package license creates flexibility following the entry that may occur through innovation. This flexibility discourages inefficient invent-around. At the same time, the package license enables a commitment not to charge prices that exploit sunk complementary investments made by the licensee.
A central finding is that, in many settings, package licensing does not have the adverse effects on invent-around incentives alleged in the second argument of the opening paragraph.
Intuitively, this is so for two reasons. First, although package licensing may attenuate inventaround incentives in comparison with other types of licensing, this reduction can bring private incentives closer to their socially optimal level. To the extent that R&D is motivated solely by the desire to avoid paying royalties for intellectual property that would otherwise be licensed, the innovation gives rise to private benefits, but makes no contribution to total surplus. Second, the argument about incentive effects neglects to account for the fact that a licensor could adjust the license fees for its remaining patents should one of its patents become ineligible for licensing.
As we will show, such adjustments can allow the licensor to achieve the effects that critics ascribe to package licensing, and can do so in ways that result in lower welfare than would package licensing. 6 Thus, we do not address the additional issues raised when multiple owners pool their patents into a single license. For an excellent recent analysis, see Lerner and Tirole (2002) .
Our analysis confirms in some respects the standard intuition that there is only "one monopoly rent" and that an owner of two complementary patents can extract this rent by charging for either or both. However, in other respects our results differ sharply. If the manufacture still requires a license to use one or both patents after investing in R&D and complementary assets, then the IP incumbent can extract all of the available rent by charging for the use of only one patented technology. This is consistent with the "one monopoly rent" intuition. However, before the manufacturer invests, the allocation of license fees to individual patents affects the profit that the IP incumbent can achieve from its patents by influencing the manufacturer's investments in both R&D and in complementary assets. When the manufacturer can invent around the patents or invest in complementary assets, the incentives for these investments depend not only on the level of the fees, but also on how they are allocated to individual patents.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II lays out the baseline model in which a single incumbent owns a pair of complementary patents that can be used by a single potential licensee to produce final output. Section III characterizes the equilibrium when package licensing is allowed, while Section IV characterizes the equilibrium when component licensing is mandatory.
Section V examines several extensions of the baseline model. The paper closes with a short conclusion.
II. THE BASELINE MODEL
In this section we describe the baseline model, characterize the first-best investments in R&D and complementary assets, and examine the equilibrium under short-term contracting. We use these results to describe equilibrium outcomes with package and component licensing.
A. Model Structure
There is a single final good, production of which requires completion of two processes, X and Y. At the start of the game, there is a single incumbent intellectual property rights holder (the "IP incumbent") holding two patents, each one covering a technology that can accomplish one of the two processes. The IP incumbent does not have the ability to commercialize the patented technology on its own. Instead, it can offer a license to a single potential licensee (the "manufacturer"). If no licensing takes place, the IP incumbent earns no profit. Unless it has access to technologies covering both processes, the manufacturer cannot engage in production.
There are two types of IP incumbent. A bad IP incumbent possesses worthless intellectual property. That is, the gross economic benefits derived from its technology are zero regardless of any complementary investments (e.g., plant, equipment, and marketing expenditures) made by the manufacturer. A good IP incumbent possesses valuable intellectual property.
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Let λ denote the ex ante probability that the IP incumbent is good. Throughout, we assume λ is common knowledge. If it has access to both technologies from a good IP incumbent, the potential licensee derives gross economic benefits of B(s) from production, where s is the level of complementary investment made before production. We assume B(⋅) is continuous, nondecreasing, and bounded from above with B(0) ≥ 0. Cases in which B(0) > 0 correspond to settings in which production does not require the manufacturer to make sunk investments in specialized complementary assets. 7 We assume that the IP incumbent's intellectual property is perfectly protected by patent, which eliminates the risk of expropriation analyzed in Yao (1994, 2002) .
We assume that the manufacturer can invest in R&D to produce output without infringing the IP incumbent's patents. 8, 9 Innovation is costly and stochastic. Successful innovation by the manufacturer creates a perfect substitute for the IP incumbent's good technology. The cost of achieving a given probability of success is assumed to be independent of whether the IP incumbent's technology is good or bad. 
. We assume that R(⋅) and B(⋅) are common knowledge.
The timing of the game is as follows (the model's timeline is illustrated in Figure 1 ). We assume that the manufacturer is the sole potential innovator in order to avoid problems of three-party bargaining. If we were to have a successful independent innovator, then the entering innovator would have to compete with the IP incumbent to reach a licensing agreement with the manufacturer. The prize to innovation would thus depend on the nature of licensing competition, as well as whether the IP entrant had a prior agreement with the manufacturer, which could be used to avoid the licensee's holding up the IP entrant.
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In addition to inventing substitute technology, it may be possible to redesign the product to avoid infringement. The analysis merely involves reinterpreting the variables for innovation as variables for redesign.
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We assume independence for simplicity. None of our central findings hinges on this assumption. Throughout we assume that the incumbent makes take-it-or-leave-it contract offers.
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We also assume that, in equilibrium, the IP incumbent will choose to make no offer at all rather than
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In theory, a license contract might distinguish situations in which the manufacturer does not infringe because it does not produce output from situations in which the manufacturer produces output using noninfringing technologies. As will become clear, the proofs of Propositions 1 through 2 would be unaffected by allowing such a distinction.
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As will become evident, this assumption exacerbates a potential hold-up problem and thus reduces the parameter set over which short-term licenses are optimal. Thus, as will also become evident, relative to other bargaining assumptions, our model has a large set of parameter values over which a ban on package licensing will have effects on the equilibrium outcome.
make an offer that will almost certainly be rejected or that would yield zero expected profits if accepted.
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After choosing whether to accept or reject the first-stage contract, the manufacturer makes investments s, R(q X ), and R(q Y ). It is assumed to be common knowledge that, at the end of the investment stage, the manufacturer learns the outcomes of its R&D projects and the quality of the IP incumbent's technology. It is also common knowledge that the IP incumbent receives signals of s and the outcomes of the manufacturer's R&D projects. In our baseline model, we assume that these signals are perfectly informative, but perfectly unverifiable in court. We also assume that R(q X ) and R(q Y ) can neither be observed by the IP incumbent nor verified in court.
Thus, the parties cannot write enforceable contracts directly on the manufacturer's investment levels.
14 At the start of the second stage, the IP incumbent can make a take-it-or-leave it offer of a new contract to the manufacturer, which the manufacturer chooses to accept or reject. Because it covers contingencies for the same period in which it is offered, we refer to this type of agreement as a short-term contract. If the manufacturer already has accepted a long-term contract in the investment period, the production-period contract represents renegotiation. We assume that the parties cannot commit not to engage in renegotiation. If the manufacturer accepts the incumbent's contract offer at the start of one or both of the stages, it can produce using the incumbent's licensed technologies in the production stage. Alternatively, the manufacturer can produce using its own technology if it succeeds in inventing-around the patents for both X and Y, 13 Alternatively, one could break the indifference by introducing an arbitrarily small cost of making offers to the model. 14 Clearly, the IP incumbent could enforce the efficient investment levels if it could contract directly on s, R(q X ), and R(q Y ).
or it can produce using a license for one of the technologies and invent around the other. We assume that the technologies used by the manufacturer are observable and verifiable. Productmarket profits are realized at the end of the production stage.
The key difference between long-and short-term contracts is that, under a long-term 
as a lock-in contract because the license fee is independent of the manufacturer's production-stage actions and is equivalent to a fixed-fee paid up front. At the other pole, under component licensing, each technology must be sold separately. That is, there is a set charge for the use of technology i which is independent of whether other technology is used, and there is no charge for a technology if it is not used.
The legal environment also specifies what happens if a firm tries to produce the product without first obtaining a license. We assume that the IP incumbent can obtain preliminary injunctive relief, so that the manufacturer cannot produce unless it either takes a license from the IP incumbent or has invented a non-infringing substitute technology.
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Our equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium with some sensible restrictions (to be described below) on how out-of-equilibrium actions would be interpreted.
For the analysis that follows, it is useful to introduce the following notation. Let t be a parameter that measures the probability of production by the manufacturer, either because it licenses a good technology or because it invents around the incumbent's patents. Define
The properties of B(⋅) imply that S*(t) and U*(t) are continuous and non-decreasing with S*(0)=0
and U*(0)=0. We assume there exists a δ > 0 such that S*(t) = 0 for t < δ. To make the problem non-trivial, we assume that B*(1) > 0.
We let Q*(u) denote the solution to
The convexity of R(⋅) implies that the solution is symmetric. Clearly, Q*(u) is a non-decreasing function.
At times we assume that the following additional condition is satisfied by the R&D cost function:
For an interesting analysis of the use of injunctions, see Lanjouw and Lerner (2001) .
When this condition holds, Q*(B*(1)) = 0. Clearly, in equilibrium the manufacturer never invests a total of more than S*(1) in complementary assets. Therefore,
Lemma 1: Suppose Condition A holds. If it must invent around both patents to obtain a payoff from successful R&D, then the manufacturer undertakes no R&D in equilibrium.
This condition implies that pure package licensing eliminates invent-around incentives-the effect cited by its critics.
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B. Welfare Benchmarks
As a benchmark, consider the socially optimal outcome, where total surplus is our welfare measure. In the baseline model we assume that the manufacturer's customers enjoy no surplus from the product. This assumption also implies that no R&D is undertaken in the first-best outcome even when the IP incumbent's technology is bad.
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(1)
Under symmetric information, complementary investment is valuable if the licensed technology is good, which occurs with probability λ, or if the technology is bad and the manufacturer invents a substitute, which occurs with probability (1-λ)q 2 . Hence the manufacturer invests
C. Short-Term Licensing
If the IP incumbent and manufacturer do not agree on a long-term contract in the first stage, then they will negotiate a short-term contract in the second stage. Suppose that no long- Given the anticipated license fees, the manufacturer makes its first-stage investment decisions to:
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An optimum exists and U is well-defined because the objective function is continuous and the actions are Let q and ŝ denote the solution to Program (2). Observe that, unless q = 1, the manufacturer's marginal incentives to invest in complementary assets are less than the marginal social value of the investment.
We can further characterize the short-term contracting outcome when the all-or-nothing condition is satisfied. In this case, Lemma 1 implies that the manufacturer conducts no R&D when it anticipates a short-term contract. Moreover, because the manufacturer then anticipates earning zero profits in the production stage, it chooses s = 0. There is a hold-up problem with short-term licensing whenever B*(0) < B*(1).
Observe that m 0 π is the manufacturer's reservation profit level for accepting a long-term contract in the first stage. A key implication is that the strength of the credible threat to refuse a lock-in contract is independent of whether the IP incumbent engages in package licensing. The manufacturer's threat in bargaining is to wait to innovate. In the second stage, the manufacturer earns B(s) if it innovates around both of the incumbent's patents (which occurs with probability 2 q ) and zero expected profits otherwise. The reason is that second-stage short-term licensing would take place after the uncertainty about the R&D's success has been resolved, and the IP incumbent can adjust its license fees accordingly.
III. PACKAGE LICENSING
We now examine the use of long-term, package licenses. We divide our analysis into those cases in which the parties are symmetrically informed at the time the first contract offer is made and those in which they are not.
chosen from a compact set.
A. Symmetric Information
Suppose that it is common knowledge that the IP incumbent and manufacturer are symmetrically informed about the quality of the IP incumbent's technology at the time the IP incumbent makes a take-it-or-leave-it contract offer at the start of the investment stage. That is, both the manufacturer and the IP incumbent know λ, the probability that the incumbent's technology is good, but neither party knows whether the technology is actually good or bad. This information becomes common knowledge at the start of the production stage.
Suppose the IP incumbent offers a lock-in contract. With symmetric information, the contract offer leads to no updating of beliefs under perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Because the license payments are fixed, the manufacturer becomes a residual claimant conditional upon taking a license, and the manufacturer chooses s and q to maximize total surplus conditional on the information available to the parties, as in welfare benchmark Program (1) above.
Clearly, conditional on offering a contract that is accepted in the first stage, the IP incumbent can do no better than offer a long-term, lock-in contract that satisfies the 
where the last step follows by revealed preference. When the parties are symmetrically informed, a lock-in contract supports the information-constrained, socially efficient levels of investment in It follows from Proposition 1 that, with symmetric information, banning package licensing weakly lowers total surplus and the IP incumbent's profits.
B. Asymmetric Information
Now suppose that it is common knowledge that the IP incumbent learns his type before making an initial contract offer, but the manufacturer does not learn the IP incumbent's type until after choosing whether to accept the IP incumbent's first-stage contract offer and making firststage investment decisions.
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When deciding whether to accept a contract in the first period, the manufacturer must form beliefs about the quality of the IP incumbent's technology. Recall that λ denotes the prior probability that the incumbent's technology is good. Let µ denote the manufacturer's subjective probability that the IP incumbent has good technology conditional on the IP incumbent's contract offer. Suppose that the IP incumbent offers a long-term pure package license with 
Suppose that Condition A holds and the IP incumbent offers a license with L 0 = 0 and
. This contract yields no profit for an IP incumbent with bad technology, and by assumption such an incumbent does not make this offer. Hence, conditional on this contract offer, the manufacturer expects the IP incumbent's technology to be good, corresponding to µ =1 in Expression (3). By Lemma 1, the manufacturer chooses not to invest in R&D, and the manufacturer's expected profit as a function of s is
Several readers have suggested that the first-best could be obtained in this situation by having the IP incumbent purchase the manufacturer for a lump-sum amount. Implicitly we are assuming that such a purchase is infeasible because the IP incumbent has limited access to funds (consider an IP incumbent selling a license to Microsoft). Alternatively, a more complex model would have two-sided asymmetric information.
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The full equilibrium beliefs are the following: The manufacturer interprets any offer with L 0 > 0 as coming from a bad incumbent with a probability of at least (1-λ), while it interprets any contract offer with L 0 = 0 as coming from a good incumbent. The beliefs for L 0 < 0 are irrelevant.
Observe that, by the definition of U*(⋅), the package license fee satisfies ) 1 (
Therefore,
• If the manufacturer chooses s such that B(s)
, it earns -s. In this case it should choose s = 0 and earn zero.
• 
Hence, the manufacturer will invest no more than S*(λ) in complementary assets, and an IP incumbent with good technology would earn at most U*(λ) under pooling. As long as B*(1) > 0 and λ < 1, it will be the case that U*(λ) < U*(1) and an IP incumbent with good technology would offer the separating contract above rather than a pooling contract. Given that S*(λ) = 0, Lemma 2 implies that a pooling component contract would yield no profits as well. However, there exist profitable separating component contracts with 
, which yields profits of ¾ B*(1). We have 
V. EXTENSIONS
In this section, we consider several variants and generalizations of our baseline model.
A. Socially Valuable R&D
One possible objection to our baseline model is that we minimize the chance that package licensing can harm welfare because we assume that successful R&D yields technology that is no better than the IP incumbent's good technology. It is readily seen, however, that relaxing this assumption would be inconsequential in the symmetric information case. Under a lock-in contract, the manufacturer is the residual claimant to the benefit of any improvements due to R&D and thus has private incentives equal to the social benefits.
The situation is more complex when the parties are asymmetrically informed at the time of initial contract negotiations. We will now show that package licensing can lead to insufficient incentives to invest in superior technologies in some cases, but can lead to the manufacturer's having socially excessive R&D incentives in others. Moreover, package licensing can stimulate R&D in comparison with short-term contracts that might arise if package licensing were banned.
Suppose that, if the manufacturer succeeds in inventing around the IP incumbent's patent i, i ∈{X,Y,Z}, then the gross benefit function from the product market is γ i B(⋅) where γ i > 1 and
Also suppose that the value of λ is sufficiently small, that there is no pooling equilibrium under package licensing. Conditional on accepting a long-term contract from a licensor it believes has good technology, the manufacturer chooses s, q X , and q Y to maximize
The derivative of expected manufacturer profits with respect to q X is ( ) ( )
In contrast, the marginal social value of R&D is 22 Now there is an opportunity cost of using the IP incumbent's technologies if the manufacturer has successfully innovated, so we can no longer simply assume that
there is a distinction between not using the IP incumbent's technologies and shutting down. However, splitting L 0 into two components would not matter below-both still would have to be equal to zero to avoid pooling.
The difference between the marginal gross private return and the marginal gross social return to R&D with respect to q X is ( )
, then Expression (5) This finding can hold even when Condition A is satisfied. That condition implies that the manufacturer would not undertake R&D solely to avoid having to pay a package license fee.
However, even when the condition holds, the manufacturer may engage in R&D with a package license if R&D can produce a more valuable technology. Under these circumstances, the possibility of avoiding the license fee creates an additional private-but not social-benefit and can lead to excessive investment in R&D.
Now suppose that γ Y = 1 and
then the manufacturer would earn profits in the second stage only if it invented around both of the IP incumbent's patents. For some values of R(·) and B(·), these conditions would induce the manufacturer to make no investments and shut down. Hence, when those conditions are
One can make L Z large by increasing γ X , while making q Y small through the choice of R(·).
Hence, for some parameter values, the difference between the marginal gross private and social return to R&D is negative. The source of the distortion is that renegotiation occurs on the equilibrium path when the manufacturer invents around one patent but not the other.
Renegotiation leads to a hold-up problem with respect to R&D investment. The IP incumbent raises the fee in its license fee demand in renegotiation when it observes that the manufacturer has developed an improved version of one technology but still needs to take a license from the IP incumbent for the other technology.
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Although package licensing can inefficiently attenuate R&D incentives, it is not evident that this is a problem with packaging per se. Consider, for example, the effects of short-term licensing. Under short-term licensing, the equivalent of second-stage renegotiation occurs in all states of the world. Thus, under short-term licensing, the manufacturer gets no benefits from R&D unless it invents around both of the IP incumbent's patents simultaneously. This is so even though successfully inventing around a single patent yields the manufacturer a technology superior to the incumbent's.
Lastly, suppose that, in addition to increasing the gross benefits available to the manufacturer and IP incumbent, successful R&D generates benefits that are appropriated by consumers. Because the manufacturer does not count the increase in consumer surplus as a benefit, there is a downward bias in its R&D incentives. As is typical in the theory of the second best, the distortions identified earlier in this subsection could offset or exacerbate this bias.
A similar effect is identified and analyzed in Choi and Stefanadis (2001) .
There is, however, no direct link between the IP incumbent's use of package licensing and the manufacturer's ability fully to appropriate consumer benefits.
B. More Patents and More Production Stages
The baseline model with symmetric information readily generalizes to the case of more than two patents or multiple production periods. When there are multiple production stages, the IP incumbent has another tool for circumventing a prohibition on package licensing. In particular, suppose that there are two production periods, one of which occurs before the manufacturer can complete any projects to invent around the IP incumbent's technologies. Then the license fees collected in those periods can act as up-front payments that (partially) replicate the effects of a lock-in contract. For example, if λ = 1 and U*(2) < B*(2), then by choosing ε sufficiently small, the IP incumbent could come arbitrarily close to attaining the effects of a package license by setting L X = L Y = U*(2)/2 -ε for use of the technologies in the first production period, and L X = L Y = ε for their use in the second production period.
In order to generalize our analysis of the asymmetric information case to n patents and T production periods, one can use the following extension of Condition A:
Observe that this becomes a weaker condition as n rises because, for a given R(⋅), B(⋅), and q, the left-hand side of the inequality rises with n while the right-hand side falls. Of course this condition could be weakened if future benefits were discounted. An interesting question for future research is whether a sequence of overlapping multi-period contracts can provide investment incentives in cases where the economic life of complementary capital is more than one period, while at the same time providing the IP incumbent with the flexibility to adjust its license fees in response to successful innovation by the manufacturer.
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C. Optimal Licensing Contracts Without Condition A
Under Condition A, the good IP incumbent can do no better than to offer a package license (Proposition 2). Without this assumption, a separating package license cannot achieve the first best outcome because the manufacturer will invest in R&D. Nonetheless, we show that under some conditions a package license is profit-maximizing for the IP incumbent. Let 
(ii) The equilibrium is a pooling, lock-in contract if λ is sufficiently large.
We describe the general approach to the proof and relegate the details to the Appendix. The work of Rey and Salanie (1990 and 1996) demonstrates the power of overlapping, intermediate-term contracts.
L X . We show that sufficient conditions for the profit-maximizing separating contract to have L X = L Z are that either ) (
. Under these conditions, we then show that a package license dominates any other separating license for any feasible value of s. Finally, we consider when the equilibrium is a separating contract and when it is pooling.
As an example, suppose the cost of R&D is
The R&D function satisfies the condition that ) (
is decreasing in q. Assume first that the IP incumbent is restricted to charging L 0 = 0. As before, the manufacturer believes that only a good IP incumbent would offer the contract. With a separating package license, the incumbent
and the manufacturer's investment in R&D. Let 
This condition is satisfied if λ is sufficiently small. When long-term package licensing is feasible, there is no renegotiation on the equilibrium path after the signals are realized. However, the threat points are determined by the manufacturer's option of refusing to sign a long-term contract. Thus, although the IP incumbent can still attain a first-best outcome under the conditions identified in Propositions 1 and 2, the IP incumbent may have to offer a package license that yields the manufacturer information rents.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The economic effects of package licenses are more subtle and complex than popular intuition asserts. Our simple formal model illustrates several broader points that apply to package licensing when the licensor knows the licensee's values of the patents. First, prohibiting package licensing can result in equilibrium contracts that induce inefficient invent-around R&D in situations where package licensing would forestall it. In other cases, the licensee's incentives to innovate may be socially excessive even under package licensing. Second, shorter contracts can be a (partial) substitute for package licensing. For some settings in our model, the IP incumbent can use short-term contracting to adjust its contract offer after the uncertainty about innovation has been resolved and can thus fully exercise whatever market power remains. More generally, this analysis indicates that-absent the ability to engage in packaging-licensors may shorten the length of pricing commitments and thus retain flexibility to respond to changes in the ability to collect fees for specific patents. One of the effects of prohibiting package licensing can thus be to induce the private parties to adopt contracts that result in less efficient complementary investment because of hold-up problems. Third, when there are multiple production periods, a long-term component contract under which some payments are made before any innovation has taken place can also serve as a (partial) substitute for package licensing in some circumstances. 
then the manufacturer undertakes R&D in equilibrium.
Proof: Let µ denote the manufacturer's subjective probability that the IP incumbent has good technology conditional on the IP incumbent's contract offer. The manufacturer's marginal return to R&D is 
and the manufacturer earns
The incumbent's problem is to maximize its profit subject to
, and the manufacturer's investments in R&D. We can ignore the constraint Assume s is fixed and form the Lagrangian
The Lagrange multipliers are non-negative with
Profit-maximization by both the incumbent and the manufacturer require (note that
Lemma 1 implies that either q X > 0 or q Y > 0 or both. Suppose q X = 0. Then the incumbent's profit is 
Equations (A.6)-(A.8) define the incentive compatibility conditions for the manufacturer.
Taking total derivatives of (A.6) and (A.7) with respect to L X , L Y , and L X gives the R&D response functions:
Note that These results imply that
Substituting for A and B with 0
The sum of the first four terms is strictly negative because ) (s dB The incumbent will choose a package license if 
The right-hand-side of (A.11) approaches 26 From the manufacturer's problem (see Appendix 1), q solves If the R&D function satisfies either of these sufficiency conditions for a given value of s, the optimal separating contract is a pure package license with , which establishes that a pure package license is the optimal separating license.
We assumed that the manufacturer's individual rationality constraint, 
